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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
CASE NO. 14030
vs.
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal
corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION; OSCAR A. ROBIN; and HARDY
SCALES CO., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT, OGDEN CITY, THAT APPELLANT'S
CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY WAS NOT TIMELY FILED MISCONSTRUES
THE LAW.
Ogden City argues that Gibbons and Reed Company's
claim for damages was not timely under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953 because it was not filed within ninety days after the cause
of action arose*
The city's reliance on the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act is misplaced in light of Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530
P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).

In Greenhalgh the court had to deter-

mine whether the operation of a hospital by Payson City was
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a "governmental function" as used in the context of
63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 to bring the hospital
within the scope of our Governmental Immunity Act.

Sec-

tion 63-30-3 provides:
Except as may be otherwise provided
in this act, all governmental entities shall
be immune from suit for any injury which may
result from the activities of said entities
wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function*,
[Emphasis added].
The court considered the arguments that the term "governmental function" should be interpreted to mean any activity
performed by a governmental entity but rejected this argument in favor of the more traditional approach:
It is certain that prior to this enactment those terms ['governmental1 and
•proprietary1] had been widely used and had
come to have distinct and antithetical meanings in our law. We should assume that the
legislature was aware of this and that they
used their language advisedly. Therefore,
if it had intended to include proprietary
functions within the scope of the act, it
could have easily so indicated by omitting
the final phrase, "governmental function,"
from the just quoted Section 63-30-3.
*

*

*

It is therefore our conclusion that
proprietary functions of a municipality are
not within the coverage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 530 P.2d at 801.
Because the 90-day provisions of 63-30-13 apply only
to claims arising from the exercise of a "governmental
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function" and not those arising from the exercise of a
"proprietary" function, it is necessary to distinguish the
two concepts.

In Greenhalgh the court discussed important

factors in making that distinction:
A primary one is whether the activity
is something which is done for the generalpublic good and which is generally regarded
as a public responsibility. Coupled with
this, other matters considered are whether
there is any special pecuniary benefit
to the City; and also, whether it is of
such a nature as to be in competition
with free enterprise.
These same factors were cited by the Utah Supreme Court
in Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961)
and Ramairez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955)
as tests to determine whether a function is governmental or
proprietary.
On the basis of the above factors the activities of
respondent Ogden City were clearly proprietary in nature and
the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act are inapplicable to this action.
Furthermore, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act took
effect as of July 1, 1966, and applies only to claims arising
after that date.

Chapter 139, §37, laws of Utah 1965. The

plaintiff's claim arose at the time of the city's repudiation or total breach in May, 1966. Restatement of Contracts,
§318.

The Governmental Immunity Act was not yet in effect.

-3-
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Even if it were questionable whether the limitation
period prescribed in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act or
the provisions of 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 were
applicable to the case at bar, this court should adopt the
statute permitting the claim to be filed.

With regard to

the construction of statutes requiring notice, 56 Am.Jur.
2d, Municipal Corporations, §687 states:
Statutory and charter provisions conditioning the right to maintain an action
against a municipal corporation upon the
giving of certain prescribed notice within
a specific time after accrual of the cause
of action are in derogation of the common
right of the people of a commonwealth to
maintain their common-law or statutory causes
of action anywhere within a state where the
proper venue attaches, under the same rules
of practice and procedure accorded them at
any other point or place in the state. Accordingly, such provisions are to be construed
strictly and not extended by implication beyond
their own terms, where they are invoked by a
municipality to avoid liability. * *.*.
As to proprietary activities, 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 sets forth the requirements for making claims
against cities and towns. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, supra.
The first sentence of that section deals with defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructive conditions of streets, alleys,
etc..

The second sentence of that section, which governs

plaintiff's claim, states:
Every claim, other than claims abovementioned, against any city or town, must be
presented, properly itemized or described

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and verified as to correctness by the claimant or his agent, to the governing body within one year after the last item of such account or claim accrued, and if such account
or claim is not properly or sufficiently itemized or described or verified, the governing
body may require the same to be made more specific as to itemization or description, or to
be corrected as to the verification thereof.
[Emphasis added].
Ogden City contends that even under 10-7-77 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, the action was not timely filed on September
3, 1968, because Gibbons and Reed relies upon repudiation
of the option in May, 1966, and the last day in which a claim
could be filed would be in May, 1967. But no actionable
claim arose until damages were sustained.

The precise sum

in which Gibbons and Reed Company would be damaged, if at
all, could not be determined until completion of the stripping, hauling, and placing of material from the alternative
sites and the rehabilitation of those sites.
In Boulder City v. Miles, 85 Nev. 46, 449 P.2d 1003
(1969), a city subdivided a tract of land, grading and compacting the soil.

Approximately two years after completion

of the city's work, the plaintiffs1 house began to crack
due to faulty compaction of the soil.

The city argued that

the time for filing a notice of claim began to run from the
last date it worked on the lots, while the plaintiff urged
that it commenced when the actual damages occurred.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Re-

I
jecting the city's position, the court said:
It is true that in most cases damages
caused by the wrongful act of another occur
contemporaneously with the wrongful act.
But it is also true that no one has a claim
against another without having incurred damages. And the reason for the rule is quite
clear. Though an act may endanger the person or property of another, no actionable
wrong is committed if the danger is averted.
It is only the injury to a person or the damage to property arising from a wrongful or
negligent act which constitutes an invasion
of a personal right protected by law and,
therefore, an actionable wrong. A cause of
action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce an injury. Otherwise, in certain cases, as in this case, a
purported cause of action might be barred before liability arose. [Emphasis added and
citations omitted].
In the instant case, damages could not be determined
until completion of the project, and plaintiff's filing is
therefore timely whether computed from the date of its last
work in the alternate pits (October, 1967) or rehabilitation
of the pits (March, 1968).
The language of 10-7-77 clearly contemplates the filing
of notice and the running of the time for doing so after the
amount of damages is determined.

The statute provides that

claims must be presented within "one year after the last
item of such account or claim accrued."

That the ascertain-

ment of such damages cannot be properly made and presented
until the last item of damages accrues is indicated by the

-6-
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i
i

requirement of "sufficient" and "specific" itemization.

See

Moran v. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407, 173 Pac. 702 (1918).
The provisions of 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 are
substantially the same as Section 312, Compiled Laws of
Utah 1907, construed by the Utah Supreme Court in Dahl v.
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 Pac. 622 (1915).

With respect

to the notice of claim provisions, the court said:
* * * It will be noticed that the statute
is comprehensive and sweeping in its terms
respecting the claims that must be presented
to the city council before an action can be
brought and successfully maintained thereon.
These claims are divided into two classes:
one class consists of claims "for damages or
injury alleged to have been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge," which must be presented "within thirty days after the happening
of such injury or damage." The other class
consists of "every claim, other than the claims
above mentioned," must be presented, properly
itemized or described, etc., within one year
after the last item of such "account or claim"
accrued.
The court held that injuries to crops alleged to have
been caused by seepage water from the defendant's canal
came within the second class of cases, and that the claim
had to be filed within one year after the last item of
damage accrued.

This position is consistent with the gen-

eral limitations rule applying to breach by anticipatory
repudiation.

Restatement of Contracts, §322.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF!S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
Respondents Ogden City and Robin and Hardy Scales
Company argue that the option agreement is unenforceable
because it does not comply with the Statute of Frauds.

It

is contended that the Statute of Frauds require the writing
to contain all elements of the contract and the option does
not define the amount of fill to be removed.
In response to this argument Gibbons and Reed Company
contends that the option is not covered by the statute of
frauds, the option is sufficiently certain and the city is
estopped to assert the statute of frauds.
The September 30, 1965 "Option For Purchase Of Road
Building Material" makes it clear that the contract was
not a sale of an estate in land or even a mining interest,
but merely a right to remove certain materials from the
property.

The option specifies that it is for sale of "road-

building material from the property of the owner" and that
the Road Commission does not have a "right to all materials
on the above described property."
The material referred to consists of sand and gravel
and, in the context of this case, do not fall within the
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statute of frauds.

In 37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds,

§83(b) it is stated:
A mineral, while it remains in the soil
is part of the real estate so that a contract
for its sale in such state is within the statute of frauds; but a contract for the sale
of a mineral as such, severed from the soil,
is not one for the sale of land within the
statute of frauds.
It is immaterial who severs the mineral from the soil.
The fact remains that the only interest to be acquired by
Gibbons and Reed Company would be a right to the minerals
from the property.
Even if the option agreement were to fall within the
statute of frauds the contract would be enforceable.

The

purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud or, in other
words, to prevent a party from being held responsible by
oral, and perhaps false, testimony for a contract he claims
he never made.

73 Am.Jur.2d, Statute of Frauds, §510. With

this purpose in mind recent decisions from this court have
enforced contracts despite the fact the entire contract
was not reduced to writing.
In Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974),
the plaintiff, an experienced miner and mining operator,
alleged that he entered into a joint venture contract with
the defendant, owner of certain mining claims in Piute
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County, to discover and produce ore.

The alleged contract

was based in part on conversations between the parties when
they were alone, conversation in the presence of third parties and certain writings in the form of letters.

The let-

ters did not precisely set forth the terms of the agreement
nor did they describe the claims.

In fact, no writing made

mention of the mining claims or indicated that plaintiff
was to have an interest in the land.

All that was clear

was that if a company was formed to operate the claims the
parties were to share equally in that company.

No company

was formed and defendant eventually sold the mining claims.
Plaintiff then brought this action to recover the value of
his alleged interest in the mining claims by virtue of the
purported joint venture agreement.

Despite the absence of

a clear and unambiguous writing the court held plaintiff
was entitled to share equally with defendant in the proceeds
of the sale.
In Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 469
(1959) , the defendant partnership promised plaintiff in
writing a 10% interest in the company if plaintiff would
continue working for the partnership.

Plaintiff worked for

the company an additional three years and defendant refused
to distribute a 10% interest to plaintiff.

-10-

The partnership
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defended on the ground the assets of the partnership consisted of leaseholds and interests in lands which had not
been conveyed in a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. The court refuted the statute of frauds
defense and made these cogent observations:
From careful attention to the wording of
that section it will be seen that there
is no requirement either that the instrument in writing demonstrate a valid consideration, or that it be a complete contract
in any other particular. All that is required is that the interest be granted or
declared by a writing subscribed by the
party to be charged. For the purpose of
establishing that there was such a grant
by the partnership it is not essential that
its assets be described with particularity.
The purpose of the statute is that certain
matters of great importance such as the
conveyance of real estate should be protected against frauds and perjuries. As between the contesting parties here, that requirement is satisfied by the letter in
question; and the granting of the 10% of
the interest in the partnership includes the
grant of its assets.
If the option agreement in the case at bar is affected
by the statute of frauds it is sufficient in form to satisfy
its requirements. As noted above, the purpose of the statute is to protect against fraud and perjuries neither of
which is present in the instant case. The option agreement
is complete in every respect other than the exact amount of
fill which could be removed and this term is easily implied.
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Even if the statute of frauds did apply to this case
and the option agreement was not sufficient to satisfy its
requirements, the city is estopped to assert it*

The

function of equitable estoppel is stated at 28 Am.Jur.2d,
Estoppel and Waiver, §28, and it is submitted that its
policy is applicable in the case at bar:
The doctrine of estoppel is based upon
the grounds of public policy, fair dealing,
good faith, and justice, and its purpose is
to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and
who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine
of estoppel springs from equitable principles
and the equities in the case. It is designed
to aid the law in the administration of justice
where without its aid injustice might result.
Estoppel may be used to preclude a party from asserting
the statute of frauds:
It is universally conceded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to
preclude a party to a contract from asserting
the unenforceability of a contract by reason
of the fact that it is not in writing as required by the statute of frauds. 73 Am.Jur.
2d, Statute of Frauds, §565.
In Mohler v. Park County School District, 32 Col.App.
388, 515 P.2d 112 (1973) the plaintiff was employed as superintendent of schools. At a meeting of the school board a
resolution was passed to offer plaintiff a contract for the
upcoming year.

Plaintiff was present at the meeting and

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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thanked the board for their action, intending his thanks
to operate as an acceptance.

Plaintiff returned to school

believing he was employed for the next school year.

In

the prior year he had accepted a verbal offer and his written contract was not executed until after the school year
began.

At a subsequent meeting the school board rescinded

the resolution to reemploy plaintiff and plaintiff instituted this action for breach of his alleged employment contract.

The court held there was sufficient evidence to

support findings that there had been detrimental reliance on
the promise and held for plaintiff.
In Lloyd Crystal Post No. 20 v. Jefferson County, 72
Ida. 158, 237 P.2d 348 (1951) the city and Legion Post
entered into an agreement whereby the Legion Post was to
convey the property to the city and the city would obtain
federal financial assistance to repair and remodel the
building thereon.

The city would then reconvey the pro-

perty back to the Legion Post when certain mortgages were
paid.

The agreement was performed and the city quit claimed

the property back to the Legion Post pursuant to resolution
of the city council.

However, respondents alleged that the

reconveyance was invalid because it was not done in compliance with an Idaho law requiring enactment of an ordinance
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and the holding of an election after notice in which a
majority of the electors voted in favor of the reconveyance.
The court distinguished between contracts absolutely prohibited by statute and contracts which are within the corporate power but which, in the making thereof, some irregularity occurs . The court classified the case as within the
latter category and held the post received good title and
the city was estopped from denying the validity of the reconveyance.
In Studer Construction Company v. Rural Special Improvement District No. 208, 148 Mont. 200, 418 P.2d 865 (1966) plaintiff was awarded a contract for construction of a sewer.

On

completion the work was okehed by the board of commissioners
but the city of Billings contended the sewer was inadequate*
The controversy between the board and city was resolved by
an agreement whereby the commissioners agreed to pay for additional work on portions of the sewer.

When the work was

done the district refused to pay for the entire cost on the
basis the cost of improvement including extras was over the
approximate estimate and the contractor brought an action
for breach of contract.

The court ruled the commissioners

were estopped from asserting the cost of improvement including the extras was over the approximate cost and held
for the contractor.
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In McDowell v. Cagle, 205 Okla. 554, 240 P.2d 783
(1952) , a lessor and lessees had an agreement whereby
they were to share the harvest of alfalfa on the premises.
When the lessees began harvesting, the lessor pursuaded
them to postpone doing so until after the expiration of
the lease since the alfalfa would later be more valuable
as a seed crop than as hay.
The lessor argued that for various reasons the oral
extension of the lease did not constitute a contract.
The court, estopping the lessor to rely on defects in the
oral agreement, found that the lessees had relied on the
oral agreement and changed their position to their detriment.
This court in Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d
598 (1970), announced adherence to the following definition
of estoppel set forth in Blacks Law Dictionary:
"An estoppel by the conduct or adminisions of a party * * * it is, and always
was, a familiar principle in the law of contracts. It lies at the foundation of morals
and is a cardinal point in the exposition
of promises, that one shall be bound by the
state of facts which he has induced another
to act upon."
The case at bar is brought within the doctrine of equitable estoppel by reason of the city's unconscionable act of
inducing Gibbons and Reed Company to believe it had an option

-15-
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m

m
for materials and to prepare its bid and enter into a contract with the commission on the basis of that belief.

The

•

city knew Gibbons and Reed Company was relying on the option agreement in computing its bid.

The discussions be-

tween Mike Gibbons and the Assistant City Engineer were re-

•
•

ported to the City Engineer; and regardless of whether the
Assistant City Engineer could contract for the city, the

I

notice and knowledge given to him is imputed to the city.
See 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, §273 et seq..
POINT III

I
m

RESPONDENTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY HAVE SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURTS.

I

In 1969, the Utah State Legislature enacted 78-27-22
et seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, hereinafter called the

•

"Long-arm Statute", which provides for the exercise by Utah

•

courts of in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.

The legislative purpose in enacting this statute

|

is set forth in 78-27-22 as follows:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands the state provide its citizens
with an effective means of redress against
non-resident persons, who through certain
significant minimal contact with this state,
incur obligations to citizens entitled to
the state's protection. This legislative
action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially
increased the flow of commerce between the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
I
i

several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this state and
persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to insure
maximum protection to citizens of this state,
should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction
over non-resident defendants to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, [Emphasis added].
The acts whereby a non-resident submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the Utah courts are outlined in 78-27-24 Utah
Code Annotated 1953:
"Any person, notwithstanding section
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through
an agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim arising:
"(1) The transaction of any business
within this state;
"(2)

. ..

"(3) The causing of any injury within
this state, whether tortious or by breach
of warranty;
11

(4) The ownership, use or possession
of any real estate situated in this state;
*

*

*«

Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts under each of
the above cited subsections.
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The initial basis whereby respondents Robin and Hardy
Scales have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Utah
courts is the "transaction of business within this state."
This term is defined in 78-27-23 as follows:
"As used in this act:
*

*

*

"(2) The words transaction of business within this state1 mean activities
of a non-resident person, his agent, or
representatives in this state which affect
persons or businesses within the State of
Utah."
The language of 78-27-24(1) together with the definition given "transaction of business within this state" in
78-27-23(2) would, without more, indicate jurisdiction could
be exercised over non-residents when such non-residents performed virtually any act within this state.

While this broad

reading of the statutory language is limited by the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as announced
by the United States Supreme Court in opinions such as
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
66 S.Ct. 154 (1945) , McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199 (1959) and Hansen v. Denkla,
357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228 (1958), the requirements of
these cases are satisfied in the case at bar.
In Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d
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332 (1971) , plaintiff, a Utah citizen, brought an action
against Zale, a Texas corporation, to recover wages, an
incentive award, vacation pay and moving expenses allegedly
owed him for services rendered to defendant in Alaska.
Service of process was made upon one Hankin, an assistant
vice-president and regional manager of the defendant corporation.

Zale moved to dismiss the action on the ground that

there had been no proper service of summons upon the defendant.

The district court granted the motion and plaintiff

appealed.
Remanding the case, the Utah Supreme Court commented
upon the definition given the term "transaction of business"
by 78-27-23(2) as follows:
"It is appreciated that the language
just quoted is necessarily a broad-sounding
generality; and it must be so interpreted and
applied as to confirm with basic concepts of
fairness and due process of law. This mandates that a foreign corporation should not
be subjected to undue difficulties from lawsuits merely because its products are distributed in this state or may be purchased
and sold by others therein. On the other hand,
when a foreign corporation is permitted to enjoy the advantages of having activities carried on within a state to further its business
interests under the protection of its laws,
it is only fair and reasonable that its citizens have some practical means of redress if
grievances arise." 482 P.2d 332 at 333, 334.
[Emphasis added].
In Rudd v. Crown International, 26 Utah 2d 263, 488

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

P.2d 298 (1971) , this court upheld jurisdiction over
a Nevada corporation and indicated that the courts might
have jurisdiction on the basis of minimal contracts even
without the Long-Arm Statute.
It is evident from the decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court in Hill v. Zale Corporation and Rudd v. Crown International , supra.f that when a non-resident corporation purposely carries on economic activities within the State of
Utah and avails itself of the protection of the laws of Utahf
then the non-resident corporation has submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of Utah courts.

In the instant case, Hardy

Scales was conducting its business in Utah, and Robin and
Hardy Scales negotiated for and entered into a contract for
the sale of real property located in Utah with representatives of a municipal corporation located in Utah, and have
engaged in activities in Utah having a pronounced effect
on the business of a corporation domiciled and doing business in Utah.

Except for the testimony of Robin and of the

representatives of Hardy Scales, all evidence and witnesses
relating to this matter are located in Utah.

In view of the

decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Utah, it is clear that Utah courts have jurisdiction over respondents Robin and Hardy Scales and should
exercise that jurisdiction.
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As a second ground for jurisdiction under the Utah
Long-Arm Statute the respondents Robin and Hardy Scales
committed a tortious injury within this state by intentionally interfering with the contract between appellant and
the Utah State Road Commission.

As a result of the tor-

tious conduct of respondents Robin and Hardy Scales, Gibbons
and Reed Company was unable to remove roadbuilding materials
from property located in Ogden City and was, thereby, injured.

Appellant's injury arises directly from the tor-

tious conduct of Robin and Hardy Scales which falls clearly
within the language of 78-27-24(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953.
The final ground of jurisdiction arises directly from
the ownership and use by respondents Robin and Hardy Scales
of real property located in Utah and falls within the provisions of 78-27-24(4).

The real property located in Ogden,

Utah, purchased by respondents Robin and Hardy Scales, was
subject to the right of appellant to enter upon said property
and remove therefrom roadbuilding materials.

Respondents

Robin and Hardy Scales have refused, and continue to refuse,
to allow appellant to enter upon this real property and remove roadbuilding materials.
Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales argue that Gibbons
and Reed Company has failed to plead facts enumerated in
the Utah Long-Arm Statute which would vest the Utah court
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with jurisdiction.

Because of this failure it is asserted

appellant never obtained jurisdiction over respondents

I

Robin and Hardy Scales.

i

A district court complaint served under the Long-Arm
Statute need not allege jurisdictional acts.

It is pro-

vided in 78-3-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the constitution and
not prohibited by law; * * *
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross claim or third party shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (2) the demand for judgment for
relief to which he deems himself entitled.
Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
As district courts in Utah are courts of general jurisdiction , claims for relief in actions in such courts do not
require jurisdictional allegations.
This question was recently considered by the Nevada
Supreme Court in Certain-Teed Products Corporation v. Second
Judicial District, 87 Nev. 18, 479 P.2d 781 (1971).

Nevada

I

i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i

has adopted a long-arm statute virtually identical to that ••'.^;'•• ;:»:adopted in Utah and, like Utah, Nevada has adopted, with some
modification, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

-22-
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In Certain-Teed, the petitioner moved to quash service
of process for want of jurisdiction and because service was
not made upon an authorized person.

Petitioner was a foreign

corporation not qualified to do business in Nevada but had
supplied building materials for construction of a warehouse•
The court held that, as plaintiff had failed to submit competent proof of the capacity of petitioner's chief legal
counsellor to receive service of process , the service should
have been quashed.

The court then stated:

"The petitioner next contends that
neither the amended complaint nor the affidavit which was filed in support of the
order authorizing service of process outside the State of Nevada contains a sufficient statement of facts to warrant service
of process or to confer jurisdiction on the
trial court. However, neither NRS 14.065
[the Nevada long-arm statute] nor NRCP 4 (d)
(1) requires an affidavit or order as a prerequisite to serve a process. The amended
complaint does state a claim for relief against
the petitioner within the framework of NRS
14.065 when tested by the rules generally applicable to pleadings. NRCP 8(a). A more detailed statement of facts is not required and
a failure to allege that the contract was made
in Nevada is not essential. The pleading is
adequate to place a claim for relief within
NRS 14.065 (2) (a).
CONCLUSION
The activities of Ogden City complained of by appellant
arose from the exercise of a proprietary function.

In addi-

tion, the first item of appellant's claim accrued prior to
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July 1, 196 6, the effective date of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

For both of these reasons, appellant's

claims are not governed by the provisions of that act.
Under the applicable statute, 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated
1953, appellant's claim was timely made as it was filed
within one year after the last item of the account accrued.
Appellant's claim is not barred by the statute of
frauds, since the option agreement is not covered by the
statute of frauds. Even if it were, the option is suffi-

i
i
i
i

ciently certain and the city is estopped to assert this
defense.
Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales have purposely engaged in economic activities within this state and have
availed themselves of the benefit and protection of Utah
law.

They are subject to the jurisdiction of Utah's court.
Respectfully submitted,

Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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